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Alternative Arrangements for the Distribution of Intraday Liquidity
James J. McAndrews
In July 2006, the Federal Reserve will end its provision of free daylight credit to government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), financial services corporations created by Congress to establish 
a secondary market in mortgages and other consumer loans. To meet their payments to investors, the
GSEs can use a wide variety of alternative funding arrangements. While such arrangements can in
theory distribute liquidity efficiently, a decline in the intraday funds in circulation following the
Fed’s move may lead to some slowing in payments by both the GSEs and commercial banks.
A
s part of its role in the nation’s payments
system,the Federal Reserve processes the
principal and interest payments made
through banks to investors in the debt- and mortgage-
backed securities issued by government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs).1 These payments range from roughly 
$30 billion on an average day to more than $80 billion on
the two days a month when the housing GSEs—Fannie
Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie
Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation)—
make their payments to investors.2 Currently,the Federal
Reserve Banks provide free daylight credit for the principal
and interest payments of the GSEs—that is,they advance
the funds for these payments,at no cost,until the GSEs’
accounts at the Reserve Banks are replenished later in the
day.3 In July 2006,however,the Federal Reserve plans to
end the practice of providing daylight credit to the GSEs.4
This edition of Current Issues explores several alterna-
tive arrangements through which the GSEs could obtain
daylight credit to fund their payments to investors.One set
of approaches calls for the GSEs and other participants to
use existing market arrangements such as correspondent
banking,credit lines,and repurchase agreements to borrow
the necessary funds.Another approach is to create explicit
or implicit markets for intraday funds that would provide
incentives for commercial banks to direct funds to the
GSEs.Still other adaptations to the loss of daylight credit
might involve the prefunding of principal and interest
(P&I) payments or a change in the market conventions gov-
erning the time of settlements.
The discussion of funding alternatives is followed by a
look at how the Federal Reserve’s discontinuation of day-
light credit to the GSEs will affect the cost and availability
of intraday liquidity and the timing of payments for all
participants in the payments system.Because the GSEs’
P&I payments to investors are made early in the day to the
commercial banks that hold the investors’accounts,the
Fed’s extension of credit to the GSEs indirectly increases
the funds in circulation among banks and other market
participants during the remainder of the day.With the
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loss of this credit arrangement, this article argues, the
amount of intraday funds in circulation is likely to decline,
causing a rise in the average cost of intraday liquidity for
commercial banks.Moreover,the GSEs that turn to market-
based sources of funding will, of course, incur a cost for
credit that the central bank had provided free of charge.The
higher costs of intraday funding for both GSEs and banks
will in turn likely lead to some delay in payments generally.
The paper’s concluding section presents a method of
evaluating the success of alternative funding arrangements
following the July 2006 change in Federal Reserve policy.
A finding that payment delays are no greater on the days of
the housing GSEs’ high P&I payouts than on other days
would provide strong evidence that the market was distrib-
uting liquidity efficiently to the GSEs.
Providing Intraday Liquidity to the GSEs
Currently, the Reserve Banks—acting on behalf of the
GSEs—pay out interest and principal on the GSEs’debt- and
mortgage-backed securities at about 8:30 a.m.on the day
that the interest is due or the securities mature.Because the
accounts that the GSEs maintain at the Reserve Banks for the
payment of their P&I obligations typically lack sufficient
funds to meet these obligations until later in the day,
the GSEs rely on daylight overdraft credit provided by the
Federal Reserve. Over the course of the business day,
the GSEs will receive,from the repayment of various invest-
ments, the funds necessary to cover their payouts.
Nevertheless,there is clearly a mismatch in the timing of
GSE outflows and inflows during the day.
Once the GSEs no longer use daylight credit from the
Federal Reserve to make their P&I payments,the banking
system will have to make alternative arrangements to over-
come the mismatch in the timing of GSE payouts and
receipts.These arrangements are examined in detail below.
First,however,this article considers the specific problems—
here termed frictions—to which the Fed’s provision of day-
light credit provided one solution, and that now must be
addressed by the GSEs in some other way.
Frictions in the Provision of Liquidity 
The frictions that such arrangements to distribute liquidity
must overcome include a search friction,a timing friction,
and an incentive friction.5 While these frictions are not
unusual in funding markets,they are likely to be magnified
when liquidity must be distributed within a narrow intraday 
window. Given the high volumes and values of payments
transferred intraday in modern large-value payments sys-
tems,timely and precise delivery is crucial in successfully
circulating liquidity in sufficient amounts during the day.
Search Friction
The search friction refers to the efforts that would be necessary
for both a payor (the party that intends to send a payment
to some other party) and potential liquidity providers to
make contact with one another and to determine the right
amounts of liquidity to transfer to the payor’s accounts.
Suppose a payor did not have sufficient funds in its account
and also lacked access to credit provided by the central bank.
It would then have to borrow the amount of the payment
before sending it.Because the payor would not necessarily
know which other party had sufficient funds in its account,it
would have to search for such a benefactor.
2
1Government-sponsored enterprises are financial services firms created by the
U.S.Congress to provide low-cost financing to homebuyers,students,farmers,
and other groups of borrowers.The GSEs have established secondary markets
in loans to these groups by pooling the loans and converting them to tradable
securities.
2See Betsy Irwin-McCaughey, Paul Agueci, Jane Buyers-Russo, and Kevin
Caffrey,“Federal Reserve Policy Change,” panel discussion at the Securities
Industry Association’s Operations Update Conference, New York, New York,
November 18, 2005, available at <http://www.sia.com/opsupdate2005/pdf/
FedReservePanel.pdf>.
3The provision of daylight credit by a central bank may obviate the need for any
market-based mechanism for the provision of intraday funding. Various 
economic models have explored certain conditions in which the provision of
daylight credit can be consistent with efficiency.It is not the case,however,that
all central banks have provided such credit.
Once the GSEs no longer use daylight
credit from the Federal Reserve to make
their P&I payments, the banking system
will have to make alternative arrangements
to overcome the mismatch in the timing of
GSE payouts and receipts.
4The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System announced the policy
change in September 2004.(See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System [2004] and the press release at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/press/other/2004/20040923/default.htm>).The change reverses a
1994 decision granting the GSEs a temporary exemption from fees on daylight
overdrafts resulting from the Reserve Banks’release of principal and interest.
The new rule aligns the treatment of the GSEs with that of other institutions
that do not have access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window.Note that
while the Federal Reserve’s policy change will also affect certain international
organizations,the impact on the GSEs is the principal focus of this article.
5This account of frictions assumes an environment in which the central bank
provides no daylight credit.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 3
Timing Friction
The timing friction refers to the operational difficulty of
delivering funds at the precise time of the day that they are
needed. Even if parties overcome the search friction and
agree on a specific amount of funds to be delivered,how can
the borrower be assured of the receipt of the funds at a parti-
cular time? If the liquidity provider is a commercial bank,it
may have operational difficulties,or experience delays for
other reasons.In that case,the borrower would simply have
to wait for the delivery of the funds,an outcome that would
defeat the point of the arrangement.
Incentive Friction
In a competitive market, a robust price discovery process
typically ensures that incentives are properly aligned for both
sides of the market.If prices fall to excessively low levels,for
example,suppliers reduce the amount offered.By contrast,if
prices are too high,other providers can enter bids that under-
cut the current providers,thereby keeping prices in check.
Achieving such balanced incentives,however,may not be
easy when providing daylight credit. First, the potential
profit in providing credit intraday is small because the
duration of such loans is so short. Lending $1 billion
overnight at a 4 percent interest rate yields approximately
$111,000 in earnings,but lending it for an hour at the same
rate would yield only $4,600.Given that the processing costs
for arranging the delivery and return of funds are probably
higher for an intraday loan than for an overnight loan while
the risks may be roughly similar,it may not be profitable for
potential lenders to enter the market at low interest rates.
Second,the way that intraday funding is currently dis-
tributed relies heavily on market participant behavior that 
is influenced more by custom than by price signals. For
example,the GSEs make their principal and interest pay-
ments to many commercial banks early in the morning,
and the commercial banks return investments of GSEs
(along with the earnings on those investments) to them
later in the day.The GSEs may simply rely on a change in 
the sequence of payments (even though it imposes costs on
the commercial banks) in which the banks return invest-
ments first and the GSEs make their principal and interest 
payments later in the day.In other words,the GSEs could
choose to delay payments if they would otherwise face a
high cost of borrowing funds intraday.
Alternative Funding Arrangements
The GSEs could use a number of methods to make large pay-
ments once they no longer use the daylight credit provided
by the Federal Reserve Banks.Some of these methods are
“price-mediated”—that is,the GSE would pay a price for the
use of the funds early in the day and return the funds to the
lender later in the day.Others are non-price-mediated; they
require a change in practice but no fee for the temporary use
of funds. This section assesses these alternative arrange-
ments,giving particular attention to how effective each is in
overcoming the frictions outlined earlier.
Non-Price-Mediated Arrangements
Prefunding payments. One option for the GSEs would be 
to prefund their payments by holding funds on deposit
overnight at the Federal Reserve.An important advantage of
prefunding is that it eliminates search and timing frictions
because the GSEs would not need to rely on others to fund
their payments.
This option is,however,a costly one.By holding funds
overnight in a non-interest-bearing account,a GSE would
lose the earnings it could realize from lending or otherwise
investing the funds at a rate close to the federal funds rate—
the rate at which banks lend their surplus balances to one
another in the federal funds market.For example,using a
recent day’s value of P&I payments,one could calculate that
holding the full amount of the next day’s P&I payments
overnight would cost a GSE roughly $12 million at a fed
funds rate of 4 percent. This loss of overnight earnings
would represent a significant incentive friction.
Moreover,this approach,used alone,might be especially
disruptive for the Federal Reserve because the amounts of
the GSEs’P&I payments vary considerably across days,from
a low of $30 billion to a high of $80 billion.If the GSEs were
to hold sufficient amounts in their accounts overnight to
cover the next day’s payments,the Federal Reserve,other
The frictions that arrangements to 
distribute liquidity must overcome include
a search friction, a timing friction, and an
incentive friction.
A second option for GSEs that can no
longer overdraw their P&I accounts at the
Reserve Banks is simply to delay making
payments until they receive sufficient
incoming payments to cover their outlays.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 12, NUMBER 3
things equal, would have to conduct additional market
operations to offset the effect of this method of funding on
banking system reserves.
Delaying payments.A second option for GSEs that can no
longer overdraw their P&I accounts at the Reserve Banks is
simply to delay making payments until they receive suffi-
cient incoming payments to cover their outlays.Of course,
the GSEs must expect to receive such payments for this
method to work.
As a solution to the GSEs’ funding problems, delaying
payments does not fully address the search and timing fric-
tions identified earlier; it is essentially a passive approach
that relies on other parties to fund the payor’s account.Nor
does delaying payments address the incentive friction satis-
factorily,because the payor is not providing good incentives
for others to fund its account.
Delay can,however,be reduced if the payor makes partial
payments as funds come into its account.In this way,the
funds can be recirculated more frequently, working to
quicken the settlement of related payments.Note that the
Federal Reserve and market participants,acting on the rec-
ommendation of an industry work group,are implementing
operational changes that will allow the GSEs to make partial
payments of their P&I obligations throughout the day.6
Changing market conventions.A third option for distributing
liquidity intraday would involve a change in the conventions
governing the timing of various payments.Participants in a
payments system,in principle,agree on the time ofday when
payments are to be made. For example, funds borrowed
overnight through repurchase agreements are customarily
returned in the morning,while funds borrowed overnight in
the interbank federal funds market are typically repaid 
in the afternoon.When the agreement on timing is common
to all participants in the payments system—as in these
examples—it can be described as a market convention or a
marketwide arrangement; when the agreement is made
between the two individual parties to a trade, it can be
described as a bilateral arrangement.
A change in the conventions regarding the timing of settle-
ments (or, alternatively, a change in the settlement time
agreed to by the parties to a specific trade) can affect the way
payments are funded during the day. For example, if the
funds lent out through a federal funds trade were to be
returned early in the morning,then the lenders would have
access to their funds sooner and could make payments with
the proceeds of these repayments.Of course,the borrowers
that returned the funds earlier would then have a smaller
amount of funds early in the day. Although the outcome
would depend on the payments to be made on a particular
day and on the party making those payments,a change in
the timing of marketwide repayments would clearly affect
the circulation of liquidity.In particular,if the lenders in the
overnight markets had large payments to make on a particu-
lar day,early return of overnight borrowing might lead to
earlier settlement of these payments.
As a solution to intraday liquidity problems,a change in
the timing conventions governing the settlement of various
transactions could address both the timing friction and the
incentive friction.With a shift in the timing of fed funds
returns generally,those lenders that needed to make pay-
ments early in the day would be reasonably confident of
having more funds to do so. In addition, market interest
rates might adjust to reflect additional costs that such a
change would occasion,thereby minimizing any incentive
problems.A change in the timing of settlements would not,
however, address the search friction because the change
would be a marketwide,rather than a bank-specific,phe-
nomenon.Banks that needed additional funding would still
have to search for appropriate counterparties.
For the GSEs in particular,another solution to intraday
liquidity problems would be to change the time at which
4
The Federal Reserve and market participants,
acting on the recommendation of an industry
work group, are implementing operational
changes that will allow the GSEs to make
partial payments of their P&I obligations
throughout the day.
A final change in market practices that
could increase the circulation of liquidity
more generally would be a move by several
parties—including the Federal Reserve
System perhaps—to make use of various
queuing and liquidity-savings mechanisms
in payments systems.
6See <http://www.frbservices.org/Wholesale/CM-2005/CM-247.pdf> for a
description of these changes and <http://www.frbservices.org/Wholesale/
FedwireSecuritiesPSR.html> for additional information on the policy and
operational changes.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 5
they sell debt. If they were to sell notes (the duration of
which is usually more than one day) early in the morning,
these sales could provide a source of funding early in the 
day for their principal and interest payments. Another 
convention that the GSEs could change is their practice of
concentrating most of their P&I payments on specific days.
Were they to spread their P&I payments across the days of a
month,liquidity demands on any one day would be signifi-
cantly reduced.
A final change in market practices that could increase 
the circulation of liquidity more generally would be a move
by several parties—including the Federal Reserve System
perhaps—to make use of various queuing and liquidity-
savings mechanisms in payments systems.7 These mecha-
nisms could automatically match the inflow and outflow of
payments to an account,so that the market’s liquidity could
be circulated quickly,speeding the settlement of payments.
Bilateral Price-Mediated Arrangements
Other options for GSEs in need of daylight credit would
involve payment for the temporary use of funds.At present,
there is no large active market for intraday borrowing and
lending among banks, in part because most banks have
access to daylight overdrafts from the Fed.Market instru-
ments could,however,be adapted to offer the GSEs a means
of funding their intraday payments. Consider first some
bilateral arrangements—funding solutions that would be
worked out between two individual parties.
Correspondent banking. Correspondent banking offers one
price-mediated means of accommodating the funding needs
of GSEs and other institutions that lack access to daylight
overdrafts. Currently, some banks rely on correspondent
banks to oversee and meet their intraday liquidity needs
because they are prohibited from borrowing from the
Federal Reserve during the day or because they do not want
direct responsibility for managing a Federal Reserve account.
The GSEs could avail themselves of the same arrangement,
although the payments that the GSEs typically make to
investors may be too large for any one correspondent bank to
wish to assume.Large payments could be spread among a
number of banks; still, it is doubtful that correspondent
banking alone could meet the full general need for intraday
liquidity.
Lines of credit.GSEs could also make use of bilateral funding
arrangements that rely on lines of credit. The borrower
would pay a fee for the option to draw down its intraday line
of credit,and anytime it drew on this credit,it would pay an
additional fee for the use of the funds intraday. Lines of
credit can support an efficient price-setting mechanism 
if there is sufficient competition among potential lenders 
in the market.Moreover,the option-like features and combi-
nation of fixed- and variable-price components that are
characteristic of credit lines make this a useful instrument
for accommodating volatile borrower needs.Credit lines are
quite similar to correspondent banking,but they differ in
one respect: in the correspondent banking alternative,the
correspondent bank chooses the timing of the payments,
while in the credit line alternative,the payor chooses when to
draw down the line of credit and when to make its payments.
Issuance of notes. Another option would be for the GSEs to
issue “discount notes”in the morning.These notes would be
auctioned off to buyers with the assurance that the GSEs
would issue the notes early,in exchange for a simultaneous
delivery of the funds used to purchase the notes.A potential
advantage of this method is that sales of the notes would be
settled in the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire Securities Service,
which settles the sales by delivering the securities,in this
case the discount notes,at the same time that the funds are
paid to the issuer of the security.In this way,the issuer of the
security,such as a GSE,can determine the time at which the
exchange occurs.
Of all the funding alternatives available to the GSEs,
those that most directly target the search friction are corre-
spondent banking,credit lines,and the issuance of discount
notes.A GSE that establishes a long-lasting or recurring
relationship with another party will not have to search for
7See Johnson, McAndrews, and Soramäki (2004) for a discussion of these
arrangements.
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funding on the day it is required. The timing friction is
largely overcome as well: the correspondent banking option
delegates the timing to the correspondent bank,and the line
of credit and discount note options allow the GSE to specify
the timing of the funds receipt.
Potential problems with these arrangements lie in the
incentive friction.If only a few banks offer such intraday
services,and if such services are relationship-based,compe-
tition may not succeed in the market,and the outcome may
fall short offull efficiency.In addition,in markets such as the
GSE market,where the amounts to be paid vary significantly
from day to day,a wider set of providers might be necessary
to achieve an efficient flow of funds.
A market for intraday funds. GSEs and other payors that
choose not to use correspondent banking or credit line
options can rely more directly on existing market mecha-
nisms to meet their funding needs.A market for intraday
funds can be operated in an essentially bilateral fashion,as
in the case of the overnight federal funds market and some
dealer-driven or over-the-counter markets.Such a market
can support a competitive outcome if the price-discovery
process is sufficiently robust,that is,if borrowers can easily
obtain price quotations.In addition,for the timing friction
to be overcome,the clearing and settlement of the market
would have to be reliable,so that the funds would be deliv-
ered quickly and would be easily identifiable upon receipt.
It may be possible to achieve this in the intraday context,
although it is likely that achieving robust price discovery
and reliable clearance and settlement arrangements is
more difficult in the intraday market than in the overnight
market because of the greater search and timing frictions
present there.
Marketwide Price-Mediated Arrangements
Organized multilateral markets offer a third set of options
for allocating scarce liquidity on an intraday basis.These
markets can be thought of as auctions combined with a
method of clearing and settling trades.
Intraday repurchase agreements. One market-based method
of obtaining intraday funding would involve the use of repur-
chase agreements.In a repurchase agreement,or “repo,”the
party seeking to borrow funds delivers securities,typically
U.S. Treasury bonds, to another party in exchange for the
needed funds.The borrower agrees to repurchase the securi-
ties at a later date for a higher price. The arrangement is
essentially a collateralized loan,in which the return of funds
is secured by bonds and the excess of the repurchase price
over the sale price constitutes the interest paid on the loan.
Currently,the shortest term for a loan executed through a
repurchase agreement is overnight.Given the improvements
in electronic information, however, the technology that
would allow intraday repos to accommodate the allocation of
intraday funding seems within reach.Were such a financial
instrument available,the GSEs could deliver securities early
in the day in exchange for funds (which commercial banks
might obtain by means of daylight overdrafts from the Fed)
and return those funds later in the day,at which time the
securities would be returned to them.If such a market was
sufficiently competitive and attracted enough participants
on both sides,it could be a very effective tool for distributing
liquidity.8
An implicit intraday market for funds.Other market arrange-
ments that could help to distribute funds would involve the
redesign of a typical federal funds purchase and repayment.
In a designated-time return of a fed funds purchase,t h e
return of the funds would occur at a specified time, say 
8:30 a.m.Such an instrument would be useful to the GSEs
(and the market generally) by allowing the GSEs to continue
lending in the overnight market on the day before large P&I
payments,confident that the funds they lent out would be
returned to them in time to make their P&I payments.This
arrangement would also have the advantage of reducing the
GSEs’demand for funding from other parties.
Interestingly, some early-return fed funds are already
used in the marketplace,with the interest rate shaved slightly
from the usual fed funds purchase. Consequently, this
instrument is familiar to many market participants.
6
8While intraday repos could be conducted on a bilateral basis between the 
borrower and lender,there are strong economies in multilateral arrangements
in which the timing of returns is governed not by the individual participants
but by the return of the repos by all parties.
Were [intraday repurchase agreements]
available, the GSEs could deliver securities
early in the day in exchange for funds . . .
and return those funds later in the day.
Other market arrangements that could help
to distribute funds would involve the
redesign of a typical federal funds purchase
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A designated-time delivery of a fed funds sale would
resemble an ordinary fed funds sale,except that the delivery
of funds would occur at a specified time,say 8:30 a.m.This
instrument could provide the means for the GSEs to borrow
the funding needed on the day of the P&I payments.
Should a GSE, having purchased funds using an early
morning designated-time fed funds sale, find itself with
excess funds late in the day,it could sell (regular) fed funds
in the market sometime later in the day,thereby recycling the
funds to the rest of the market.The combination of a pur-
chase of early-delivery fed funds and a sale later in the day of
regular fed funds creates a synthetic intraday funds market.
The difference in interest rates between the early-delivery
market and the regular market would be a measure of the
intraday premium on funding for the GSEs.
These designated-time fed funds instruments could over-
come the timing friction by centralizing the clearing and 
settlement of the trades.In this arrangement,the delivery of
funds might occur as follows: The organizer of the central
marketplace could gather bids from both sides of the market
or,alternatively,could auction the needed amounts of early
contracts submitted by the GSEs (or other potential parties
that need funds at the designated time for settlement).The
auctioneer could then prepare a list of confirmed trades for
settlement.Settlement of the designated-time legs of these
transactions could occur through the National Settlement
Service (NSS)—a system in which a settlement agent,acting
on behalf of participants in a settlement arrangement,sub-
mits an electronic settlement file to the Federal Reserve
Banks.The Federal Reserve Banks will post each of the debit
entries and subsequently each of the credit entries,usually
within minutes of the file submission.
A marketwide auction would also eliminate both the
search and the incentive frictions.Parties on both sides of
the market would engage in the auction,and prices would
adjust to competitive bids.
The arrangement does,however,have some costs.First,it
would need to meet the risk management requirements of
the Federal Reserve Policy on Payments System Risk and to
satisfy the Fed’s rules relating to the use of the NSS.9An auc-
tioneer that acted as a settlement agent and presented a list
of transactions to be settled to the NSS would need to have
made some provision for the inability of participants to 
settle their obligations in a timely manner. Second, since
banks that borrow in the designated-time-delivery market
and then sell fed funds later in the day have an expanded
balance sheet overnight, they may face increased capital
charges on their assets (that is,their loans to others).10
An explicit intraday market for funds. A final option for
meeting the liquidity needs of GSEs and other institutions
would be the creation of an explicit intraday market for
funds.Such a market would rely on a designated-time deliv-
ery of funds in the morning.The afternoon return of funds
could be arranged as a designated-time return or simply
required by the close of Fedwire.The market would solicit
competitive bids to lend funds for a time during the day.
An explicit intraday market for funds would have an
important advantage over an implicit market:it would avoid
the overnight expansion of balance sheets that arises when
banks buy and sell overnight fed funds on the same day.
However,to support an explicit market,market participants
would need to build infrastructure that would support the
processing functions for an intraday market (for example,
calculation of interest, accounting entries to the general
ledger,and same-day return of the transaction).
9Part I of the Federal Reserve Policy on Payments System Risk “applies to 
public- and private-sector payments and securities settlement systems that
expect to settle a daily aggregate gross value of U.S.dollar-denominated trans-
actions exceeding $5 billion on any day during the next twelve months.For
purposes of this policy,a payments or securities settlement system is consid-
ered to be a multilateral arrangement (three or more participants) among
financial institutions for the purposes of clearing,netting,and/or settling pay-
ments or securities transactions among themselves or between each of them
and a central party, such as a system operator or central counterparty. In
determining whether a particular arrangement meets this definition, the
Board may consider, but will not be limited to, whether the arrangement
exhibits one or more of the following characteristics:(1) a set of rules and pro-
cedures,common to all participants,that govern the clearing or settlement of
payments or securities transactions,(2) a common technical infrastructure
for conducting the clearing or settlement process,and (3) a risk management
or capital structure where at least some losses would be borne by participants
rather than the arrangement’s operator,central counterparty or guarantor,or
shareholders or owners.”(Federal Reserve Policy on Payments System Risk,
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/psr/policy.pdf>)
For the Fed’s rules on the use of the NSS, see <http://wpo.ny.frb.org:
8080/National_Settlement_Service/settlement_service_menu.cfm>.
10Consider two situations:in the first,a bank borrows funds intraday to make a
payment,then receives funds later in the day and repays its earlier borrowing;in
the second,the bank borrows funds overnightto make a payment,receives funds
later in the day,and lends out those funds overnight.In the second case,the
return of the borrowed funds will finance the bank’s own repayment of its
overnight borrowing.In addition,when measured overnight,the bank’s assets
and liabilities are higher in the second case than in the first.If regulatory capital
charges are applied to the bank’s leverage or to the loans the bank has extended,
the bank might face higher regulatory capital charges in the second case.
Settlement of the designated-time legs of
these [fed funds sales] could occur through
the National Settlement Service. Overview of Marketwide Approaches
In all the marketwide approaches discussed in this section,
the standard search friction is overcome by the auctions that
establish prices and the pattern of borrowing and lending in
each market.Nevertheless,the early-delivery markets may
need to convene and clear much earlier than the conven-
tional fed funds or repo markets.
The considerable changes from current market timing
mean that the start-up phase for the designated-time mar-
kets could be quite difficult.And these changes are likely to
magnify the problem of overcoming the incentive frictions
that accompany participation in the market.One such incen-
tive friction stems from high start-up costs; although many
of these costs are presumably onetime charges,altering com-
puter systems to accommodate an explicit intraday market
would be extremely costly.
As noted earlier,the timing friction in these markets is
addressed by settling the designated-time legs of the trans-
actions through the National Settlement Service.By using
the NSS,the early-funding provider binds itself to deliver at
the designated time. The auction of the early deliveries
would have to occur before the opening of the NSS and in
time for the settlement agent to deliver to the Federal
Reserve the settlement information on the associated early
deliveries.This method of settling the trades would assure
both sides that the funds would be transferred at the specific
time.In both the designated-time-return fed funds transac-
tion and the designated-time-delivery fed funds transaction,
the “non-designated-time”leg of the transaction would be
settled by conventional means.
Intraday Funding after July 2006
How will the availability and cost of intraday funding for
payments system participants in general be affected once the
Federal Reserve ends the GSEs’use of overdraft credit on
their P&I accounts? Consider first the current situation.One
can hypothesize that because the GSEs’principal and inter-
est payments are made early in the day to the commercial
banks that maintain investors’accounts,the Fed’s extension
of credit to the GSEs indirectly boosts the funds in circula-
tion among banks and other market participants during the
remainder of the day.This infusion of liquidity—especially
on the days of high GSE payments—most likely makes
banks less reliant on daylight credit from the Federal
Reserve to meet their own intraday funding needs.Since the
banks pay a fee on daylight overdrafts above a certain
amount,the current arrangement entails savings for banks.
Once the Fed discontinues its provision ofdaylight credit to
the GSEs,the overall amount of intraday funds in circulation
is likely to shrink.As a consequence,the average cost of intra-
day liquidity for banks may well rise as banks make greater
use of daylight overdrafts and incur the associated fees.
The increased cost of intraday credit is,in turn,likely to
affect the timing of payments for market participants.The
GSEs, facing new costs for their intraday funds, may be
inclined to forgo borrowing and instead await incoming 
payments to cover their P&I outlays to investors.Similarly,
commercial banks may respond to the higher likelihood of
overdrafts by delaying some payments in the expectation
that incoming payments will replenish their accounts and
reduce their need to borrow.11
To test the relationships posited between the amount of
funds in circulation,the cost of credit,and the timing of pay-
ments,an empirical analysis can be conducted using data on
Fedwire payments (see the box for a detailed description).In
assessing how the GSEs’loss of free daylight credit will affect
the timing of payments,this empirical analysis controls for 
a second reason that intraday funding might be costlier and
payments delayed—the increased demand for funds by
banks on days when they need to make a high aggregate
value of payments.
The first hypothesis tested is that the average time of
settlement for Fedwire payments occurs later in the after-
noon on days of high aggregate payments.The reasoning
underlying this hypothesis is that with the increased
demand for intraday funds on such days,banks may choose
to delay payments rather than incur overdraft fees. The 
second hypothesis tested is that the average time of settle-
ment occurs earlier on days when the GSEs make high P&I
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11There is a theoretical positive relationship between the intraday interest rate
charged on daylight overdrafts, or charged for intraday borrowing more 
generally, and the delay in payments.As a higher intraday interest rate is
charged,banks would send only their most time-critical payments and rely on
incoming payments to fund their less time-critical payments.
[This analysis finds that] the current 
injection of free intraday liquidity on the
days of high P&I payments induces the
GSEs—and subsequently the banks—to
make their payments more promptly. . . .
The finding suggests that the Fed’s 
discontinuation of daylight overdraft 
credit to the GSEs will lead to some 
degree of delay in payments generally. payments,after controlling for the total value of payments
settled.The reasoning here is that the current injection of
free intraday liquidity on the days of high P&I payments
induces the GSEs—and subsequently the banks—to make
their payments more promptly.
Tests of these two hypotheses show that they are not
rejected.Payments are,on average,made later in the after-
noon on days ofhigh payment value.Moreover,payments are
completed sooner on the days that the GSEs make high pay-
ments to investors,even after controlling for the total value
of payments made on Fedwire. This latter finding offers 
support for a relationship between the Fed’s provision of free
daylight credit and the promptness of payments.By implica-
tion,the finding suggests that the Fed’s discontinuation of
daylight overdraft credit to the GSEs will lead to some degree
of delay in payments generally.
Evaluating the Efficiency of Market Responses 
to the Policy Change 
The first section of this article outlined an array of alterna-
tive credit arrangements—most market-based—that the
GSEs could use individually or in combination to fund their 
I perform a test of two hypotheses regarding the timing of
payments and the scarcity of intraday funding. According
to the first hypothesis, the value-weighted average time 
of settlement depends in a positive way on the value of 
payments settled on a particular day. According to the 
second hypothesis, the average time of settlement is earlier
on days of high GSE principal and interest payments, after
controlling for the total value of payments settled.
The test is conducted using a regression analysis of
Fedwire Funds Service payments from May 3, 1999,
through March 31, 2005, a period that includes 1,485 days
of Fedwire Funds Service activity. The analysis enables 
me to quantify the degree to which the average time of 
payment settlement depends on the total value of payments
made and the value of GSE P&I payments. 
I estimate the following regression equation:
Average time of settlement of Fedwire = constant 
+ β1 (value of payments made on Fedwire) 
+ β2 (squared value of payments made on Fedwire) 
+ β3 (value of P&I payments made by GSEs) 
+ β4(squared value of P&I payments made by GSEs) + ut .
If the results conform to expectations, β1 > 0 and 
β3 < 0—that is, the average settlement time on Fedwire
occurs later in the afternoon on days of high payment values
and earlier on days of high GSE P&I payments (given the
Fed’s early and free overdraft funding), after controlling for
payment values. In addition, the estimated values of the
coefficients β2 and β4 would reveal any nonlinear value-of-
payment effects on payment timing. 
The regression results are found in the table immediately
below. The results show that on a day of average payment
volume ($1.67 trillion)—by definition, a day that does not
have high P&I payments by the GSEs—the average time of
settlement on Fedwire is 3:09 in the afternoon.a On a day
when the GSEs make high P&I payments ($80 billion),
overall settlement occurs roughly five minutes sooner. These
results are highly significant in a statistical sense.b
Test of Hypotheses
aThat calculation is as follows (with units expressed in minutes and percentages of minutes after 12:00 noon): 117.83 
+ 71.41 (1.67 trillion) - 18.46 (1.67 trillion)2 - .067 (47 billion) = 182.45, or 3:02:27 p.m.
bIn addition, I estimate the effect on payment speed when the sample is confined to parties other than the GSEs or their direct 
counterparties. This calculation measures the “knock-on” or indirect effect of the greater availability of liquidity on days of high GSE
P&I payments. After accounting for the value of payments made by third parties, I find that third parties settle payments more quickly
on days of high GSE P&I payments.
Average Time of Settlement for Fedwire Funds Transfers
Dependent Variable:Average Value-Weighted Time of Settlement
Coefficient Estimates
(In Minutes)
β1:Value settled (trillions of dollars) 01:11:25*
(00:08:36)
β2:Value settled squared (trillions of dollars) -00:18:28*
(00:02:27)
β3:P&I payments (billions of dollars) -00:00:04*
(00:00:01)







Source:Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note:Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at the 1 percent level.
www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 9payments once they no longer use daylight credit from the
central bank.How would such arrangements affect the cost
and timing of payments? And how could their efficiency be
evaluated? 
If the private sector puts in place market-based arrange-
ments that distribute liquidity efficiently,then a price will be
established for intraday liquidity that is probably at or near
the level of the Federal Reserve’s daylight overdraft fee—the
marginal cost of intraday funding to commercial banks.12
All institutions, including the GSEs, would face the same
price for intraday liquidity (albeit with adjustments for firm-
specific risk).
Moreover,if the market accommodations to the policy
change distribute liquidity efficiently,the payment activity
of GSEs would not slow overall payment activity any more
than would the payment activity of any other party. The 
reason is that, controlling for the aggregate value of pay-
ments settled,the market arrangements would efficiently
intermediate daylight overdrafts of commercial banks to the
GSEs.With all institutions facing the same price for intraday
liquidity, the likelihood of delays in payments would be 
uniform across groups.
As this analysis shows,some slowing of payments for all
market participants is likely to follow the Fed’s policy change
in July. Still, provided that the new market arrangements 
distribute intraday liquidity efficiently,the increased delay
in payments should not be significantly greater on days of
high GSE P&I payment activity than on days of low activity—
controlling,of course,for the aggregate value of payments.
This expectation provides a way to test the efficiency of
the market accommodations to the Federal Reserve’s discon-
tinuation of overdraft credit to the GSEs.
If the market accommodations fail to circulate liquidity
efficiently,then one would expect that on days of high GSE
P&I payments,the GSEs might have difficulty accessing suf-
ficient daylight credit to meet their obligations and would
hence rely excessively on delay.The same test presented in
the box would show that on these days, payments would 
settle significantly later in the day—rather than earlier,as
suggested by this article’s analysis of settlement time under
the Fed’s current policy.Conversely,if the new arrangements
distribute liquidity effectively,the test would show that the
average time of payment settlement is essentially the same
on high P& I payment days as on other days.
Conclusion
The policy change prohibiting the GSEs from using daylight
overdrafts to fund their P&I payments will likely bring 
about some significant changes in the cost of funding and
the timing of payments for all participants on Fedwire.In
particular,on days of high P&I payments,the elimination of
the Fed’s early-morning extension of credit to the GSEs may
reduce the amount of funds in circulation,prompting banks
to incur larger overdrafts or to delay payments until incom-
ing funds are received.
This article presents a number of alternative arrange-
ments by which the private sector might accommodate the
GSEs’need for funds to flow into their accounts early in the
day.Most of these methods involve borrowing in one form or
another. Correspondent banking, explicit lines of credit,
intraday repos, and explicit or implicit intraday markets
appear to have the potential to overcome the frictions that
are now surmounted by the provision of daylight overdrafts.
Changes in certain market conventions may also assist in
adjusting to the policy change.
To evaluate the efficiency of these alternative funding
arrangements,this article proposes a simple empirical test.
If,after the policy change is implemented,the value-weighted
average time of payment settlement on Fedwire is not signifi-
cantly later on high GSE P&I payment days than on other
days (after controlling for the values settled),then one could
infer that the market adaptations had been successful in dis-
tributing liquidity efficiently to the GSEs.If,however,days of
high GSE P&I activity are days of especially slow settlement
of payments,one would conclude that the market had not
fully surmounted the frictions that banks face in distribut-
ing liquidity intraday.
By announcing in 2004 the plan to end the GSEs’use of
free daylight credit,the Federal Reserve gave market partici-
pants a two-year interval in which to prepare for the change.
Should the alternative arrangements for distributing liquid-
ity prove effective,the market will have demonstrated that it
can strengthen its overall management of the frictions
affecting the intraday distribution of liquidity.
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 12, NUMBER 3
10
Provided that the new market arrangements
distribute intraday liquidity efficiently, 
the increased delay in payments should not
be significantly greater on days of high
GSE P&I payment activity than on days 
of low activity. 
12Marginal cost is the incremental cost of additional borrowing.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 11
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